Abstract. In 2004, a new attack against SHA-1 has been proposed by a team leaded by Wang [15] . The aim of this article 5 is to sophisticate and improve Wang's attack by using algebraic techniques. We introduce new notions, namely semi-neutral bit and adjuster and propose then an improved message modification technique based on algebraic techniques. In the case of the 58-round SHA-1, the experimental complexity of our improved attack is 2 31 SHA-1 computations, whereas Wang's method needs 2 34 SHA-1 computations. We have found many new collisions for the 58-round SHA-1. We also study the complexity of our attack for the full SHA-1.
Introduction
Conceptually, we can split Wang's attack in four different steps.
Step 1. Choose a suitable 80 × 32-bit vector Γ .
Step 2. Choose a differential characteristic.
Step 3. Find a set of sufficient conditions on a message m and the chaining variables which guarantees with high probability that the message pair (m, m + Γ ) follows the differential characteristic. This implies that the two messages do collide.
Step 4. Choose a message m randomly and modify it until all sufficient conditions hold.
Using this method, Wang's team succeeded in finding collisions on the most popular hash functions, namely MD4, MD5, RIPEMD, SHA-0 and 58-round SHA-1 [11, 17, 15] . The attack is conceptually simple, but its implementation turns out to be very laborious in practice. To fill this gap between theory and practice, several teams decided to compensate their lack of intuition by the power of a computer, that is to say they tried to automatize the different steps of the attack.
For instance, coding theory can be used for finding a suitable difference in Step 1 [8] of the attack. Recently, De Cannière and Rechberger [3] presented an algorithm allowing to find optimal differential characteristics in Step 2. The third step is tightly coupled with the previous one; most sufficient conditions follow from the choice of the differential characteristic.
We use algebraic techniques for actually finding collisions on 58-round SHA-1. In this case, the complexity of our method for finding a collision is equivalent to 2 31 SHA-1 computations (experimentally), whereas Wang's method needs 2 34 SHA-1 computations. As a proof of concept, we have found many new collisions for 58-round SHA-1, which have never been reported so far. We also apply our method for the case of the full SHA-1, and study the complexity of our approach.
The key idea is to describe the message modification technique into an algebraic framework. This is done by viewing the set of sufficient conditions as a nonlinear system of Boolean equations. We hope that this will be a first step towards the use of algebraic tools (such as Gröbner bases) in the cryptanalysis of hash functions.
We will focus our attention on the last step of Wang's et al attack [15] . Namely, find a message satisfying a set of sufficient conditions depending on a disturbance vector and a differential path. This message can be then use to produce a collision. We shall call conventional message modification the process [15] permitting to construct such a suitable message. Here, we will present an improved message modification technique. To do so, we introduce the concepts semi-neutral bits and adjusters.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a description of SHA-1. Along the way, we introduce the notations and definitions that will be used throughout this paper. In Section 3, we describe our improved message modification technique. We explain how to use Gaussian elimination to construct a set controlled relations from the sufficient conditions. We also introduce a new notion, that we called semi-neutral bit, and describe then our improved message modification. We also give an algebraic descriptions of our improved message modification. This permits to give an interesting connection between the cryptanalysis of hash functions and the use of Gröbner bases. In Section 4, we present the details of our method on 58-round SHA-1. In the appendix, we provide the details for the full SHA-1.
Preliminaries

Description of SHA-1
The hash function SHA-1 generates a 160-bit hash value (or digest) from a message of length less than 2 64 bits. The input message is padded and then processed in 512-bit message blocks through the Merkle/Damgard iterative structure. A 80-step compression function is then applied to each of these 512-bit message blocks. It has two types of inputs: a chaining input of 160 bits and a message input of 512 bits. The initial chaining value (called IV) is a set of fixed constants, and the result of the last call to the compression function is the hash of the message.
In SHA-1, the message expansion is defined as follows: each 512-bit block of the padded message is divided into a 16 × 32-bit word (m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m 15 ), and then expanded according to the following linear relation :
x ≪ n, denoting the n-bit left rotation of a 32-bit word x. The compression function is defined for all i, 1, ≤ i ≤ 80 as follows:
The initial chaining value IV=(a 0 , b 0 , c 0 , d 0 , e 0 ) being equal to: 0x67452301, 0xef cdab89, 0x98badcf e, 0x10325476, 0xc3d2e1f 0 .
Note that we express as usual 32-bit words as hexadecimal numbers. For n, 58 ≤ n ≤ 80, we call n-round SHA-1, the restriction of SHA-1 to the first n rounds. The Boolean function f i and constant k i employed at each step are defined as in Table 1 .
Step Boolean function fi Table 1 . Definition of fi and ki w.r.t. the step
Definition and notation
We will identify the ring Z/2 32 Z with {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 32 − 1}. If we ignore carry effects in the arithmetic of Z/2 32 Z, we can identify the ring Z/2 32 Z with the vector space F 32 2 by using the canonical bijective mapping :
Here and in the rest of the paper, we try to find a collision between two messages m = (m 0 
Moreover, we set :
Note
2 . Similarly, we define ∆, ∆ + , ∆ − , δ for the chaining variables b i , c i , d i and e i (resp. b i , c i , d i and e i ). Using the above definition, a differential characteristic and a differential are defined as follows. Definition 1. We call differential characteristic the sequence :
and differential :
An Improved Message Modification Technique
Here, we will consider a n-round SHA-1, with n, 58 ≤ n ≤ 80. We will focus our attention on the last step of Wang's attack. Thus, we will suppose that a disturbance vector is fixed, as well as a suitable differential. We can then determine sufficient conditions on the messages permitting to produce collisions. Remark that sufficient conditions depend on the choice of a disturbance vector and its differential.
3.1 How to calculate sufficient conditions on the a i ?
In this step, we only consider expanded messages by ignoring relations arising from the message expansion. We compute the sufficient conditions on chaining variables by adjusting b i , c i and d i such that for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 :
In this calculation, we must adjust carry effects by "hand". It is indeed difficult to calculate this full-automatically. In Table 2 and Table 6 , we present the sufficient conditions that we have obtained on the chaining variables for 58-round and the full SHA-1, respectively. Note that sufficient conditions on the messages are also quoted in this table.
Gaussian Elimination and Controlled Relations
To calculate sufficient conditions on the {m i,j } 0≤j≤31 0≤i≤n−1 , we take into account that ∆ + m i,j = 1 implies m i,j = 0 and ∆ − m i,j = 0 implies m i,j = 1. We also consider the relations derived from the key expansion :
We shall call controlled relations a particular set of F 2 -linear equations on the m i,j on one hand, and on the chaining variables a i,j on the other. For the m i,j , we consider the relations obtained by performing a Gaussian elimination on the linear equations defined by the key expansion, and the equations derived from the sufficient conditions. To perform this Gaussian elimination, we have considered the following order on the m i,j :
For n = 58, we obtain for instance the following controlled relations : m15,31 = 1, m15,30 = 1, m15,29 = 0,m15,28 + m10,28 + m8,29 + m7,29 + m4,28 + m2,28 = 1, m15,27 + m14,25 + m12,28 + m12,26 + m10,28 + m9,27 + m9,25 + m8,29 + m8,28 + m7,28 + m7,27 + m6,26 + m5,28 + m4,26 + m3,25 + m2,28 + m1,25 + m0,28 = 1, m15,26 + m10,28 + m10,26 + m8,28 + m8,27 + m7,27 + m6,29 + m5,27 + m4,26 + m2,27 + m2,26 + m0,27 = 1, m15,25 + m11,28 + m10,27 + m10,25 + m9,28 + m8,27 + m8,26 + m7,26 + m6,29 + m6,28 + m5,26 + m4,25 + m3,28 + m2,28 + m2,26 + m2,25 + m1,28 + m0,28 + m0,26 = 0, m15,24 + m12,28 + m11,27 + m10,26 + m10,24 + m9,28 + m9,27 + m8,29 + m8,26 + m8,25 + m7,25 + m6,29 + m6,28 + m6,27 + m5,25 + m4,28 + m4,24 + m3,28 + m3,27 + m2,27 + m2,25 + m2,24 + m1,28 + m1,27 + m0,27 + m0,25 = 1, m15,23 + m12,28 + m12,27 + m11,26 + m10,25 + m10,23 + m9,27 + m9,26 + m8,28 + m8,25 + m8,24 + m7,29 + m7,24 + m6,28 + m6,27 + m6,26 + m5,24 + m4,27 +m4,23 +m3,27 +m3,26 +m2,26 +m2,24 +m2,23 +m1,27 +m1,26 +m0,26 +m0,24 = 1, m15,22 + m14,25 + m12,28 + m12,27 + m11,25 + m10,27 + m10,24 + m10,22 + m9,28 + m9,27 + m9,26 + m8,27 + m8,24 + m8,23 + m7,28 + m7,27 + m7,23 + m6,27 + m6,25 + m5,23 + m4,28 + m4,27 +m4,22 +m3,26 +m2,28 +m2,27 +m2,25 +m2,23 +m2,22 +m1,26 +m0,25 +m0,23 = 0, . . . , m5,0 + m3,0 + m1,31 = 1, m4,31 = 0, m4,30 = 0, m4,29 = 0, m4,6 = 0, m4,1 = 1, m3,30 = 1, m3,29 = 0, m3,6 = 1, m2,31 = 0, m2,30 = 1, m2,29 = 0, m2,6 = 1, m2,1 = 1, m2,0 = 1, m1,30 = 0, m1,29 = 1, m1,5 = 0, m1,4 = 1, m1,1 = 1, m0,31 = 0, m0,30 = 0, m0,29 = 0.
The controlled relations also include a subset of the sufficient conditions on the chaining variables. Precisely, we will only consider the conditions involving a i,j , with i ≤ R. The bound R is a positive integer that will be defined later. We will call uncontrolled relations, the sufficient conditions which are not a controlled relation. We define now the notions of semi-neutral bit, control bit and adjuster. The concept of semi-neutral bit is closely related to Biham and Chen's "neutral bit" [2] and Klima's "tunnels" [22] . Namely, if the effect of flipping a bit corresponding to a chaining variable can be "easily" eliminated (i.e. such that all conditions previously satisfied can be satisfied by modifying few bits), then we shall call this bit a semi-neutral bit. Thus, the effect of changing a semi-neutral bit can be eliminated by controlling a little number of bits. We shall call these particular bits adjusters. Note that the choice of semi-neutral bits and adjusters is not unique. Thus, we have to choose it heuristically. We emphasize that each m i,j can be viewed as a polynomial on the a k, 's, with k ≤ i + 1. Indeed, each m i,j can be viewed as a Boolean function on the a k, 's, with k ≤ i + 1, by the definition of SHA-1. Note that when we view m i,j as a Boolean function, we do not approximate (based on approximating MAJ by XOR, ignoring carry effect, etc.), but consider it as exact polynomial on the a k, . Control bits are determined for each controlled relation. Control bits are chosen among the a k, which appear as a leading term or a term 'near' leading term in m i,j , where m i,j is considered as a Boolean function on the a k, . The notion of leading term being related to a term ordering, we mention that we have considered here the following order on the a k, :
Conventional/Advanced Message Modification Techniques
The last step of Wang's attack consists of randomly choosing a message and modify some of its bits until all sufficient conditions are satisfied. To our knowledge, this technique has been described for the first time in [18, 19] . We shall call this method conventional message modification technique.
Here, we introduce an improved message modification. The conventional message modification will be used to obtain a "pre-collision", i.e. a collision from the first round to a given round R. This bound R will depend on the number n of rounds considered. We take R = 23 in the case of 58-round SHA-1 and R = 26 for the full SHA-1. The improved message modification will then allow to extend the pre-collision into a real collision on n-round SHA-1. We would like to emphasize that our procedure will modify the chaining variable and not the message. Since IV=(a 0 , b 0 , c 0 , d 0 , e 0 ) is fixed, it is clear that SHA-1 induces a bijection between (m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m 15 ) and (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 16 ). This implies that a modification on the a i,j can be mapped into a modification on the m i,j . Using our new terminology, we describe the conventional message modification. For this, we use a list of controlled relations C R , and a list of control bits C B . The CMM algorithm permits then to find a collision on R-round SHA-1. Using semi-neutral bits and adjusters, we present an improved algorithm permitting to find a collision on a n-round SHA-1 (with n > R). The new procedure is as follows.
Algorithm 1 Conventional Message Modification
Algorithm 2 Improved Message Modification IMM Input : Positive integers n, R, two lists (SN B, Ad) of semi-neutral bits and adjusters, a list C R of controlled relations, a list C B of control bits, and a list S C of sufficient conditions Output : a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 16 ) ∈ F 32 2 16 satisfying all the sufficient conditions
While all the sufficient conditions of S C are not satisfied do Adjust the a i,j of a corresponding to a semi-neutral bit of SN B or an adjuster of Ad EndWhile Return a Remark 1. We mention that a different version of the CMM and IMM algorithms can be found in [9, 10] . These versions could be more suitable for those wishing to actually implement these two algorithms.
We now analyze the complexity of the IMM algorithm for finding a collision on 58-round SHA-1. In this case, we choose R = 23, i.e. the CMM algorithm will be used to find a collision on 23-round SHA-1. It will remain 5 uncontrolled relations in rounds 17-23. Therefore, the CMM algorithm needs at most 2 5 iterations for returning a collision on 23-round SHA-1. There are 29 remaining conditions from rounds 23-58. To adjust these 29 conditions, we use 21 semi-neutral bits and 16 adjusters. Experimentally, the total complexity is improved to 2 31 SHA-1 computation -with our latest implementation -whereas Wang's method needs theoretically 2 34 SHA-1 computations. Note that the cost of the IMM algorithm is dominated by the exhaustive search among 21 semi-neutral bits, which means that we could neglect the cost of the CMM algorithm. As a proof of concept, we give here a new collision on 58-round SHA-1. m = 0x1ead6636319f e59e4ea7ddcbc79616420ad9523af 98f 28db0ad135d0e4d62aec 6c2da52c3c7160b606ec74b2b02d545ebdd9e4663f 1563194f 497592dd1506f 9 m = 0x3ead6636519f e5ac2ea7dd88e7961602ead95278998f 28d98ad135d1e4d62acc 6c2da52f 7c7160e446ec74f 2502d540c1dd9e466bf 1563596f 497593f d150699
An Algebraic Description of the Improved Message Modification
We present here an algebraic description of the IMM and CMM algorithms which could be useful for further improvements. For this, we remark that the CMM algorithm is equivalent to the solving of a polynomial system of equations via controlled relations with control bits as unknown variables. Similarly, the whileloop of the IMM algorithm is equivalent to the solving of an algebraic system of equations via sufficient conditions with semi-neutral bits and adjusters as unknown variables.
In other words, let X = {X i,j } 0≤j≤31 1≤i≤n and let F 2 [X] be the polynomial ring over F 2 whose variables are X. Remark that sufficient conditions can be considered as polynomial equations via Boolean functions. Thus, they can be expressed as algebraic polynomials on the a i,j . Therefore -by replacing each a i,j by the variable X i,j -we can associate a set of polynomials on F 2 [X] to the set of sufficient conditions. With an obvious notation, we shall call controlled polynomial (resp. uncontrolled polynomial) the polynomial associated to a controlled relation (resp. uncontrolled relation).
1≤i≤n . Let then B n be a quotient ring F 2 [X]/J. Note that B n represents the set of all Boolean functions on the variables X i,j .
Let f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . ) be the set of controlled polynomials. Note that all controlled polynomials of f are in the subring
], where R is determined by n (for instance, R = 23 when n = 58 and R = 26 when n = 80). For a randomly taken a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 16 ) ∈ (F 32 2 )
16 , let C R (a) be the system obtain from the sufficient conditions by replacing each variables X i,j -not corresponding to a control bit -by a i,j . Similarly, let S C (a) be the system obtain from the sufficient conditions by replacing each variables X i,j -not corresponding to a semi-neutral bit or adjuster -by a i,j . In this setting, the CMM and IMM algorithms can roughly be described as follows: Relation between message modification and decoding of error-correcting codes. Let S be the set of all points in F = F 32 2
16 satisfying advanced sufficient conditions on {a i,j }. Note that S is a non-linear subset of F because there are non-linear conditions. Then, for a given a ∈ F which is not necessarily contained in S, to find an element in S by modifying a is analogous to a decoding problem in error-correcting codes. Hence, a conventional message modification and a proposed improved message modification including changing semi-neutral bits can be viewed as an error-correcting process for a non-linear code S in F . More precisely, for a non-linear code S in F , an error-correction can be achieved by manipulating control bits and semi-neutral bits.
4 Analysis of the 58-round SHA-1 using the Improved Message Modification
In this part, we detail the different steps of our technique for finding a collision on 58-round SHA-1. In Table 2 , we give the sufficient conditions. Note that we have only quoted the sufficient conditions for the first 20 rounds due to space limitation. For the complete list of the conditions, see [9, 10] . The control bits and controlled relations are given in Table 3 . Semi-neutral bits and adjusters are given in Table 4 .
means the leading term of controlled relation of Table 3 -'w', 'W': adjust a i,j so that m i+1,j = 0, 1, respectively -'v', 'V': adjust a i,j so that m i,(j+27 mod 32) = 0, 1, respectively -'h': adjust a i,j so that corresponding controlled relation including m i+1,j as leading term holds -'r' means to adjust a i,j so that corresponding controlled relation including m i,(j+27 mod 32) as leading term holds -'x', 'y': adjust a i+1,j−1 , a i,j−1 so that m i,j = 0, respectively -'X', 'Y': adjust a i+1,j−1 , a i,j−1 so that m i,j = 1, respectively -'N': semi-neutral bit -'q' : adjust a i,j so that relations after 17-round hold In this case, the set of bits corresponding to 'q' is exactly same to the set of adjusters.
message variable 31 -24 23 -16 15 -8
11010----01-----01aaa---0-10-100 a 5
10-01a---1-01-aa --00100-0---01-1 a 6
11--0110 -a-1001-01100010 1-a111-1 a 7 -1--1110 a1a1111--101-001 1---0-10 a 8
-0----10 0000000a a001a1--100-0-1-a 9 00------11000100 00000000 101-1-1- Table 2 . Sufficient condition on the mi,j (resp. ai,j)
The conditions remaining after the conventional message modification are listed below: a 
-
-----------------------------11 m 21 -0-----------------------0----1-m 22 01-----------------------0----10 m 23 11------------------------1---0-m 24 -------------------------------0 m 25 -1----------------------------1-m 26 10-----------------------0----10 m 27 -1-----------------------01---0-m 28 1------------------------------0 m 29 -1-----------------------1----0-
11010vv--01-----01aaa---0W10-100 a 5
10w01aV--1-01-aa --00100-0w--01W1 a 6
11W-0110 -a-1001-01100010 1-a111W1 a 7
w1x-1110 a1a1111--101-001 1---0-10 a 8 h0Xvvv10 0000000a a001a1--100X0-1h a 9
00XVrr-V 11000100 00000000 101-1-1y a 10 0w1-rv-v 11111011 11100000 00hW0-1h
W1whhhhh hhqNqNqN NNqNNWWhahhh Table 4 . Semi-neutral bits and adjusters This paper present an improved method for finding collision on SHA-1. To do so, we use algebraic techniques for describing the message modification technique and propose an improvement. The details of our attack can be found in the appendices. The proposed method improves the complexity of an attack against 58-round SHA-1 and we found many new collisions.
A Analysis of the full SHA-1
We present here the details of our method on the full SHA-1.
A.1 Disturbance vector and Differential
We start from the disturbance vector and differential given by Wang et al [13] . From these, we construct a new differential. We modify Wang's differential by changing ∆a Table 5 the new differential constructed. ∆ + a ∆ − a i = 0 00000000 00000000 00000000 i = 1 e0000001 a0000000 40000001 i = 2 20000004 20000000 00000004 i = 3 c07f f f 84 803f f f 84 40400000 i = 4 800030e2 800010a0 00002042 i = 5 084080b0 08008020 00400090 i = 6 80003a00 00001a00 80002000 i = 7 0f f f 8001 08000001 07f f 8000 i = 8 00000008 00000008 00000000 i = 9 80000101 80000100 00000001 i = 10 00000002 00000002 00000000 i = 11 00000100 00000000 00000100 i = 12 00000002 00000002 00000000 i = 13 00000000 00000000 00000000 i = 14 00000000 00000000 00000000 i = 15 00000001 00000001 00000000 i = 16 00000000 00000000 00000000 i = 17 80000002 80000002 00000000 i = 18 00000002 00000002 00000000 i = 19 80000002 80000002 00000000 i = 20 00000000 00000000 00000000 . . . i = 78 00000000 00000000 00000000 i = 79 00000040 00000000 00000040 i = 80 00000000 00000000 00000000 Table 5 . A differential for the full SHA-1
A.2 Sufficient Conditions
For the disturbance vector, and the differential given in the previous step, we give in Table 6 the sufficient conditions for the full SHA-1. In Table 6 : 'a' means a i,j = a i−1,j , 'A' means a i,j = a i−1,j + 1, 'b' means a i,j = a i−1,(j+2 mod 32) , 'B' means a i,j = a i−1,(j+2 mod 32) + 1, 'c' means a i,j = a i−2,(j+2 mod 32) and 'C' means a i,j = a i−2,(j+2 mod 32) + 1. -100---1 0aa10a1a 01a1a011 1--a11a1 a 3
01011----1000000 00000000 01--a0a1 a 4 0-101--a ---10000 00101000 010---10 a 5 0-0101-1 -1-11110 00111-00 10010100 a 6
1-0a1a0a a0a1aaa---10010---01-0--a 7
--0-0111 11111111 111-010-0-0-0110 a 8 -10---01 11110000 010-111-1---000-a 9 00----11 11111111 111----0 ----1-01 
A.3 Control bits and Controlled Relations
The control bits and controlled relations are presented in Table 7 . Now we give the semi-neutral bits and adjuster in Table 8. In this table : -'a', 'A', 'b', 'B', 'c', 'C': as in Section A.2.
-'L' means the leading term of controlled relation of Table 7 .
-'w', 'W': adjust a i,j so that m i+1,j = 0, 1, respectively.
-'v', 'V': adjust a i,j so that m i,(j+27 mod 32) = 0, 1, respectively.
-'h': adjust a i,j so that corresponding controlled relation including m i+1,j as leading term holds. -'r' means to adjust a i,j so that corresponding controlled relation including m i,(j+27 mod 32) as leading term holds. -'x', 'y': adjust a i+1,j−1 , a i,j−1 so that m i,j = 0, respectively. -'X', 'Y': adjust a i+1,j−1 , a i,j−1 so that m i,j = 1, respectively. -'N': semi-neutral bit.
-'q' : adjust a i,j so that relations after 17-round hold.
-'F' : etc.
For the full SHA-1, the CMM algorithm will be used to find a collision on 26-round SHA-1. After the conventional message modification, it will remain the 9 following conditions; which are only related to rounds 17-26: a17,3 = 0, a18,3+a17,3 = 0, a22,2+a21,2 = 0, a23,1 = 0, a24,30+a22,0 = 0, a24,3+a23,3 = 0, a25,30 + a24,0 = 1, a25,1 = 0, a26,1 = 1.
Uncontrolled Relations. There is 64 uncontrolled relations on the a i,j : a27,0 = 0, a28,30 + a26,0 = 1, a28,3 + a27,3 = 0, a29,30 + a28,0 = 0, a29,3 + a28,3 = 0, a29,1 = 1, a30,1 = 0, a31,0 = 1, a32,30 + a30,0 = 0, a33,30 + a32,0 = 0, a33,3 + a32,3 = 0, a34,3 + a33,3 = 1, a34,2 + a33,2 = 1, a34,1 = 0, a35,1 = 0, a35,0 = 0, a36,30 + a34,0 = 0, a36,3 +a35,3 = 1, a37,30 +a36,0 = 1, a37,3 +a36,3 = 1, a37,1 = 1, a38,1 = 0, a40,31 +a39,1 = 1, a40,3 + a39,3 = 1, a41,1 = 1, a42,31 + a40,1 = 1, a43,31 + a42,1 = 1, a44,3 + a43,3 = 1, a45,1 = 0, a46,31 + a44,1 = 1, a46,3 + a45,3 = 1, a47,31 + a46,1 = 1, a47,1 = 0, a48,31 + a46,1 = 1, a48,3 + a47,3 = 1, a49,31 + a48,1 = 1, a49,1 = 0, a50,31 + a48,1 = 1, a50,3 + a49,3 = 1, a51,31 + a50,1 = 1, a51,1 = 0, a52,31 + a50,1 = 1, a53,31 + a52,1 = 1, a66,4 + a65,4 = 1, a67,2 = 0, a68,0 + a66,2 = 1, a69,5 + a68,5 = 1, a69,0 + a68,2 = 1, a70,3 = 0, a71,1+a69,3 = 1, a72,6+a71,6 = 1, a72,1+a71,3 = 1, a73,4 = 0, a74,5+a73,5 = 1, a74,2+a72,4 = 1, a75,7+a74,7 = 1, a75,3 = 0, a75,2+a74,4 = 1, a76,5 = 1, a76,1+a74,3 = 1, a77,3 + a75,5 = 1, a77,1 + a76,3 = 1, a78,3 + a77,5 = 0, a79,6 = 1.
To adjust these 64 conditions, we have tried to use semi-neutral bits and adjusters as explained in the IMM algorithm. We use 10 semi-neutral bits (corresponding to 'N' in Table 8 ) and 8 adjusters which are the bits 1-bit-left to 'N'. We present an example of message m = (m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m 15 ) obtained by Algorithm 2. m = b8550bb2 5b2e1a15 88a0e568 b0d7cbaf 0b430105 1e7f 1b5e 0637da31 0dc9d562 7d857448 def ac00e 9d06ba9e 2dd8235a 324e9acb f 7c56578 c69df d0e 71bf 1d08
The above m satisfies all message conditions of 0-80 rounds and all chaining variable conditions of 0-28 rounds. 
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